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The Outer Limits of Parental Autonomy:
Withholding Medical Treatment from Children
I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial respirators, artificial cardiac pacemakers, kidney dialysis
machines, amniocentesis,' and reproductive engineering2 have become com-
mon medical terms, known and used widely today. However, with these rapid
advancements in medicine, concomitant ethical, legal, and medical dilemmas
come about, the resolution of which often lags considerably behind the medical
breakthroughs. The parental decision to withhold medical treatment from a
child is strained additionally by the new medical technology. Some of these
decisions are viewed with skepticism by society, with irony by the media, and
with caution by the courts. An additional complication is that currently there
are no clear-cut medical or legal criteria to guide parents, doctors, and courts
in resolving the human problems presented by life-saving, life-preserving, and
death-precipitating issues. Opinions differ on whether parents must take
advantage of all the medical advancements and preserve life at all costs,
regardless of their child's underlying condition and possibilities for a meaning-
ful existence.
The types of medical, legal, and moral decisions facing parents today are
vast and complex. For example, should a life-sustaining system be discon-
nected so that a child, who is in an irreversible vegetative state, is allowed to
live or die naturally?3 Should an operation be performed on a newborn infant
to cure a physical defect, leaving untouched a severe physical handicap and
possible mental retardation? 4 Should parents withhold their consent from the
performance of a risky operation that may cure the heart defect of their
otherwise dying Down's Syndrome child? 5 Should they decline to follow a
conventional but very painful treatment for their child that provides only a
slim chance of cure, in favor of a new and unproven but painless method of
treatment?
6
This Note will review the present state of the law regarding the legal
limits on parental autonomy in the area of withholding treatment from chil-
l. Amniocentesis is a minor surgical procedure that involves the aspiration of amniotic fluid from the
uterus. It is used to detect genetic diseases, such as Down's Syndrome, during the third or fourth month of
pregnancy. DOWN'S SYNDROME (MONGOLISM): RESEARCH, PREVENTION, AND MANAGEMENT 49,72 (R.
Koch & F. della Cruz eds. 1975). "This new and exciting technology, coupled with the continuing evolution in
social and ethical attitudes of our society, opens new doors for medical science-but these are doors which must
be opened with great care and concern." Id. at 52.
2. Reproductive engineering is a way of "[ilnterfering with the natural process of fertility and childbear-
ing .... Methods include all types of contraception or family planning, abortion, sterilization, artificial
insemination by husband or other donor, and in vitro fertilization." Omenn, Scientific Manipulation of the
Unborn, 1975 NATIONAL MEDICOLEGAL SYMPOSIUM 15.
3. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
4. See, e.g., In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1979).
5. See, e.g., In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949
(1980).
6. See, e.g., In re Hotbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979).
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dren. The state's power to intervene and order treatment against the parents'
decision will be examined. Also, the views on this matter within the medical
profession will be briefly stated. Finally, differing points of view within legal
and medical circles about the proper resolution of this matter will be pres-
ented.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PARENTAL AUTONOMY
The doctrine of parental autonomy had its beginnings as an issue of
constitutional stature in a series of United States Supreme Court decisions
dealing with parents' rights to direct their children's education. In 1923 in
Meyer v. Nebraska,7 the Court struck down a Nebraska statute that made it a
criminal offense to teach a foreign language to children who had not yet
completed the eighth grade. The Court stated that the liberty guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment encompassed "the right of the individ-
ual to... acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children." 8 Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,9 referring
to an Oregon compulsory education act that required children to attend the
state's public schools, the Court stated that the act "unreasonably interferes
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of children under their control." ' 0
In 1944 the Supreme Court rendered the landmark decision of Prince v.
Massachusetts. " While affirming unswerving support for Meyer and Pierce,
the Court announced that parental rights were not without limitation: "The
right... does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death." 2 The custodian of a
nine-year-old child who had been selling religious pamphlets in violation of
the state's child labor laws claimed that the conviction violated her freedom
of religion and her rights as a parent. In upholding her conviction, the Court
retreated somewhat from its prior broad rulings. However, the case stands for
the proposition, quoted in many subsequent decisions, that "the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary func-
tion and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder." 
3
Finally, in Wisconsin v. Yoder'4 the Supreme Court held that Amish
parents could not be convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school
attendance law for preventing their minor children from attending the last two
grades of high school. Although the case arose in a first amendment freedom
7. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
8. Id. at 399.
9. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
10. Id. at 534-35.
il. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
12. Id. at 166-67.
13. Id. at 166.
14. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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of religion context, the Court shed some light on the limits of parental
autonomy in the area of medical care: "[T]he power of the parent, even when
linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it
appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the
child." 5
So far, however, the Supreme Court has not explicitly stated what pro-
tection should be accorded the parental decision to withhold medical treat-
ment from their child. The only law on the subject is a product of state court
decisions, often in conflict even within a specific jurisdiction. ' 6 The guidelines
that have emerged are helpful mainly in situations in which the child is in
imminent danger of death. The most serious questions arise when the child's
life is not immediately in danger, and the treatment either is strongly recom-
mended by the medical profession or is of some value to the child, and the
parents refuse to give their consent.
i. LIMITATIONS ON PARENTAL AUTONOMY
The state acquires authority to intrude in the parental decision making
process from its police power, its parens patriae power, and its statutory
power, either through penal or child neglect statutes. Under its police powers,
the state may enact legislation for the protection and welfare of the population
at large, ' 7 which, of course, includes children. Thus, in the exercise of its
police powers, the state legitimately may provide for compulsory vaccina-
tion" over parental religious' 9 or other objections.
The state may legislate for the protection of children under the doctrine
of parens patriae.20 The concept originated in the courts of equity and, since
then, has been invoked as a legal ground to enact child neglect, abuse, and
dependency statutes. 2' In People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,22 the Illinois
Supreme Court stated that a court's jurisdiction in a parental neglect situation
is not only conferred by statutory language, but also by the fact that it is "the
responsibility of government, in its character as parens patriae, to care for
infants within its jurisdiction and to protect them from neglect, abuse, and
fraud." 2 Thus, even if a state had not enacted an appropriate statute specifi-
cally conferring jurisdiction on the court, or even if the statutory definition of
15. Id. at 233-34.
16. Compare In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955) (the court refused to intervene in the
parental decision to withold cosmetic surgery) with In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970),
aff'd, 37 A.D.2d. 668,323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900,278 N.E.2d 918,328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972)
(the court ordered cosmetic surgery over parental objections).
17. E.g., People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601 (1921).
18. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1904).
19. Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964).
20. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 212, 68 N.E. 243, 247 (1903) (Cullen, J., concurring).
21. See generally Dobson, The Juvenile Courts and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393, 395 (1970);
Rendelman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S. CAL.. L. REV. 205 (1971).
22. 411 III. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
23. Id. at 623-24, 104 N.E.2d at 773.
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neglect did not encompass the wrong suffered by the child, the state could still
use its parens patriae power as a jurisdictional basis to intervene. 24
Child neglect statutes 25 were enacted after the penal laws 26 and supple-
mented the penal sanctions with civil remedies. Although they coexist today,
it is a rare case in which parents are convicted for neglecting the medical
needs of their children.27 The most common procedure used today when
parents fail to provide a child with necessary medical treatment is court
appointment of a provisional guardian for the limited purpose of consenting to
the needed treatment or for court declaration of wardship for the limited
purpose of securing the treatment.28
While parental autonomy may be limited by the state's power to inter-
vene on behalf of the child, it may also be limited by the individual rights of
the child. The United States Supreme Court has held that, "Minors, as well as
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights."
' 9
Though parents are presumed to act in the child's best interests,30 there is
judicial recognition that this is not always the case. In recent cases the child's
independent decision to forego or undergo treatment without parental consent
has been recognized on the theory that the child, like an adult, has a right of
privacy. For example, in a series of Supreme Court decisions dealing with
abortion and contraception,32 the Court recognized "that a state could not
lawfully authorize an absolute parental veto over the decision of a minor to
terminate her pregnancy. 3 3 Aside from the Supreme Court's recognition of a
child's independent right of decision, there is also statutory recognition of the
principle. For example, some states have a specific provision for the "mature
minor."3 4 However, there is truth in the assertion that "[w]hen an apparent
conflict between the constitutional rights of a child and his parents does reach
the courts, careful analysis ... may reveal that the degree of conflict is greatly
24. See generally Areen, Intervention between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child
Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 896-99 (1975).
25. See Katz, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975).
26. In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933); Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1047 (1950).
27. But see People v. Vogel, 110 Cal. App. 2d 503,242 P.2d 969 (1952) (father held criminally liable); Eaglen
v. State, 249 Ind. 144, 231 N.E.2d 147 (1967) (parents convicted); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243
(1903) (father convicted for failure to furnish medical attention to his child).
28. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463,181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op.
2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (1962).
29. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
30. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
31. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1047-48 (E.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 119
(1977).
32. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
33. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639 (1979).
34. See, e.g., Illinois Emancipation of Mature Minors Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 2203-2 (Smith-Hurd
1980), which states, " 'Mature minor' means a person 16 years of age or over and under the age of 18 years who
has demonstrated the ability and capacity to manage his own affairs and to live wholly or partially independent
of his parents or guardian."
35. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1378 (1980).
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exaggerated. 3 5 Although children's rights are increasingly recognized to-
day, 36 and although in certain circumstances the desires of parent and child will
be in obvious conflict, it is only in the case of a "mature minor" that the child's
decision regarding treatment will be given decisive weight.
State courts differ in the amount of weight accorded the minor's stated
preference regarding medical treatment. For example, in In re Green,37 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court so that the
wishes of the sixteen-year-old boy regarding nonemergency treatment could
be ascertained. An opposite position was taken by the New York Court of
Appeals in In re Sampson.3 8 There the court indicated that the fifteen-year-old
child's preference regarding nonemergency trehtment was neither necessary
nor material. The court refused to follow In re Seiferth,39 decided fifteen years
earlier, in which the New York Court of Appeals had ruled that a twelve-year-
old child's preference to forego nonemergency surgery should be given great
weight, since the post-operative therapy would require full cooperation from
the child. In the above three cases the child was old enough to have a prefer-
ence, and in the last two cases the child's preference was identical to that of
the parents. Therefore, there never was a clash between each set of parents
and child, but merely between the state and the parents. When the conflict
between the parent and child surfaces, the disagreement raises constitu-
tional issues.
IV. THE SCOPE OF PARENTAL AUTONOMY
When parents decide to withhold medical treatment from their children,
courts have considered the following factors in deciding whether to intervene
in the parental decision: (1) whether the risks of treatment outweigh the bene-
fits; 4° (2) whether there is immediate threat to the child's life.' (3) whether the
nontreatment decision will have adverse emotional consequences on the
child;4 2 and, in general, (4) whether ihe child's life will benefit from the pro-
posed treatment.43 The approach most commonly used is a balancing of the
pertinent factors to ascertain whether there is a sufficient basis for state
intervention. However, it is difficult to reconcile the developing law in differ-
ent jurisdictions, mostly because of the emphasis placed on the facts of the
particular case, and the great amount of deference granted to the trial court's
determination of facts, especially injuvenile court proceedings. Also, in many
cases resolution of the problem is a matter of statutory interpretation of the
36. See generally H. FOSTER, A "BILL OF RIGHTS" FOR CHILDREN (1974); P. VARDIN & I. BRODY,
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1979).
37. 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972), remanding to trial court, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973).
38. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd, 29
N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
39. 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
40. See, e.g., In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
41. See, e.g., In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128 (C.P. Lucas County 1962).
42. See, e.g., In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
43. See, e.g., In re Karwath, 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972).
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pertinent child neglect, abuse, and dependency statute. Since state statutes
vary widely, their interpretation will also vary, as will their applicability to
specific parental acts or omissions constituting abuse or neglect in different
jurisdictions. 44
A. In General
The broad guidelines that have emerged from state court decisions are as
follows. In most cases in which the child's life is in imminent danger, parents
have no choice and must consent to the necessary treatment. 45 The rationale
is that the child's interest in the preservation of his or her own life is para-
mount and overrides any parental decision to the contrary, even in light of
religious objections. 46 In situations that are not imminently life-threatening,
courts generally give parents great discretion and uphold their decisions as
long as they are in the child's best interests and not arbitrary. 47 In some cases,
courts have ordered treatment over parental objections, even in circum-
stances that were not immediately life-threatening.48
The courts that have ordered treatment over parental objections in situa-
tions in which the child's life was not immediately threatened have expressed
concern for the child's physical as well as emotional well-being. In re
Rotkowitz49 concerned a ten-year-old girl who needed surgery on her foot in
order to arrest further deterioration of a leg deformity. Although only one
parent was opposed to the surgical procedure, the court stated that it would
have ordered treatment even if both parents were opposed to it, adding, "A
child who is deprived of the use of its limb which becomes progressively
worse cannot have a sense of security." 50
A great number of cases have dealt with parental religious objections to
blood transfusions needed by their children, either in connection with surgery
44. For an excellent overview and comparison of child neglect, abuse, and dependency statutes see S.
KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 57-58 (1971); Katz, Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1975).
45. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), rev'd and aff'd, - Mass. - 393
N.E.2d 836 (1979); In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1979); Heinemann's Appeal, 96 Pa. 112
(1880).
46. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 IMI. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952);
Morrison v. Tate, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 NJ. 576,279
A.2d 670 (1971); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); Muhlenberg
Hospital v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498,320 A.2d 518 (1974); In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 185 N.E.2d 128
(C.P. Lucas County 1962).
47. In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387 (1972); In re
Fr'dnk, 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553 (1952); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942). See also
Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 421 (1980); Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1118 (1973).
48. In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128,263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933); In re S., 85 Misc. 2d 846,380 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1976); In
re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 668,323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd, 29
N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972); In re Carstairs, 115 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Doam. Rel. Ct. 1952);
In re Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1941); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812 (rex. Civ. App.
1947). See generally Drake, What to Do When a Patient Refuses Treatment, LEGAL ASPECTS MED. PRAC.,
Oct., 1979, at 22; Note, Court Ordered Non-Emergency Medical Care for Infants, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 296
(1969); Note, Judicial Power to Order Medical Treatment for Minors Over Objections of their Guardians: 14
SYRACUSE L. REV. 84 (1962).
49. 175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1941).
50. Id. at 950, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
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entailing substantial blood loss 5' or in connection with an Rh blood condi-
tion.52 In People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz53 the Illinois Supreme Court
upheld an order to appoint a guardian for an eight-day-old infant girl whose
parents refused to give their consent to a transfusion. The child had eryth-
roblastosis fetalis-4 and would have died or been mentally impaired without
the transfusion. Most jurisdictions are in accord with the court decision in
Labrenz, especially when the consequences of deferring to the parents'
wishes would bring death or grave harm to the child. 55 In Hoener v.
Bertinato56 a New Jersey court went even further and ordered that custody of
an unborn child be given to the welfare department after its birth. In order to
live, the child would require blood transfusions to which the parents objected.
By way of contrast, "a competent adult generally has a right to refuse
medical treatment, even when such treatment is necessary to save his life.",
57
On the other hand, incompetent adults, even though legally unable to choose
to receive or decline life-saving treatment in their own best interest, may do
so through their legal guardian58 or through the proper court, by way of the
substituted judgment mechanism. 9
The success of needed surgery may depend on blood transfusions being
administered during the operation. Although some parents consent to the
operation, their refusal to consent to the concomitant blood transfusions
represents in effect a bar to the operation itself since physicians may refuse to
perform the operation if opportunity to transfuse is denied. In this situation
courts are split, but the weight of authority is in favor of ordering the transfu-
sion when the child's life is in danger. 60 Some courts will not appoint a
51. In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253
(1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918,328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387
(1972).
52. People ex reL Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952).
53. Id.
54. Erythroblastosis fetalis is defined as follows:
[A] hemolytic disease of the newborn; a grave hemolytic anemia that, in most instances, results from
development in the mother of anti-Rh antibody in response to the Rh factor in the (Rh-positive) fetal
blood; it is characterized by many erythroblasts in the circulation, and often generalized
edema.., and enlargement of the liver and spleen.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY ILLUSTRATED 482 (23d ed. 1976).
55. See cases cited in notes 45 and 46 supra.
56. 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
57. In re Spring, - Mass. App. Ct. ., -, 399 N.E.2d 493, 497 (1979).
58. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 55, 355 A.2d 647, 671, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
59. When a court applies the substituted judgment rule,
mhe goal is to determine with as much accuracy as possible the wants and needs of the individual
involved.
...mhe decision.., should be that which would be made by the incompetent person, if that
person were competent, but taking into account the present and future incompetency of the individual
as one of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the competent
person.
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 750-53, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31
(1977) (footnote omitted).
60. See cases cited in note 46 supra.
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guardian if the child's life is not in immediate danger.6 ' And in other jurisdic-
tions, transfusions have been ordered even in non-life-threatening circum-
stances. For example, in a case in which the child's life was not endangered,
surgery was very risky and only offered partial correction of a malformed
cheek, and the operation would be less risky if delayed for a few years, the
court in In re Sampson62 ordered a fifteen-year-old boy to undergo the
dangerous surgical procedure over parental religious objections to the blood
transfusions that would probably be required during surgery.
The cases discussed above are in irreconcilable conflict and illustrate the
disharmony in the present state of the law, as well as the need for clear and
definite guidelines to help avoid seemingly capricious ad hoc judgments by
state courts. The uncertainty is not limited to those cases that present a
conflict between the parental religious beliefs and the state's intervention
powers. For example, in In re Karwath 63 the father of three children refused
to authorize surgical removal of his children's tonsils and adenoids. The Iowa
Supreme Court upheld the order for surgery and stated that it was not "re-
quired that a medical crisis be shown constituting an immediate threat to life
or limb." 64 By way of contrast, in In re Seiferth65 the court refused to order
surgery performed on a fifteen-year-old child with a cleft palate and harelip
stating that "[h]is condition is not emergent and there is no serious threat to
his health or life." 66
B. Recent Decisions
Three cases decided in 1979 starkly present the problems that courts face
today in the area of withholding medical treatment from children: In re
Cicero,67 In re Phillip B., 68 and In re Hofbauer.69 In re Cicero dealt with
withholding medical treatment from a defective newborn, In re Phillip B. with
withholding treatment from a Down's Syndrome twelve-year-old boy, and In
re Hofbauer with withholding conventional cancer treatment from a child in
favor of treating him with laetrile, an unorthodox and unproven method of treat-
ment. Among the factors that entered into the courts' decisions'were: (1) the
medical opinions, (2) the immediacy of death, (3) the quality of life, (4) the risks
and benefits of the treatment.
61. In In re Green, 448 Pa. 378, 292 A.2d 387 (1972), the parents of a fifteen-year-old boy would have
allowed spinal surgery but would not allow necessary transfusions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court refused to
uphold an order to appoint a guardian, indicating that the physical condition of the child did not immediately
endanger his life.
62. 65 Misc. 2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970), aff'd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), aff'd, 29
N.Y.2d 900, 278 N.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972).
63. 199 N.W.2d 147 (Iowa 1972).
64. Id. at 150.
65. 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
66. Id. at 85, 127 N.E.2d at 822.
67. 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1979).
68. 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
69. 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1979).
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1. In Re Cicero
The problem of the seriously defective newborn, which was raised in In re
Cicero, has become a hotly debated issue in legal circles. 70 Abundant litera-
ture on the subject is available within the medical arena.7' This is not surpris-
ing since the decision to withhold medical treatment from a defective newborn
is made in the special care nursery, usually by the physician in conjunction
with the parents, without legal sanctions or intervention or even knowledge
on the part of the state. In In re Cicero, however, the physician disagreed with
the parents and sought a court order to appoint a guardian for the limited
purpose of consenting to the needed surgery. The case involved a baby girl
born with spina bifida, a spinal disorder 72 that required immediate surgery.
The court ordered that life-saving surgery be performed on the child, who, if
successfully treated, would be able to walk with short braces, but would still
lack sphincter control of the bladder and bowels and would run the risk of
mental retardation. If treatment had not been ordered, the infant probably
would not have lived longer than six months.73
Although some believe that withholding treatment from defective new-
borns is a new practice, it has been prevalent for centuries, though not widely
publicized until recently. 74 A study75 undertaken by Duff and Campbell in the
special care nursery of the Yale-New Haven Hospital indicated that of 299
consecutive deaths occurring there, forty-three deaths or fourteen percent were
the result of withholding medical treatment pursuant to the combined decision
of parents and physicians, and seven of the infants had the condition for which
the baby girl in In re Cicero was treated.
A widely publicized case 76 reveals the cruelty of the practice of withhold-
70. See generally Horan, Euthanasia, Medical Treatment and the Mongoloid Child: Death as a Treatment
of Choice?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 76 (1975); Morris, Voluntary Euthanasia, 45 WASH. L. REV. 239 (1970);
Mueller & Phoenix, A Dilemma for the Legal and Medical Professions: Euthanasia and the Defective Newborn,
22 ST. LOUIS U.L. REV. 501 (1978); Robertson, Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal
Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1975); Note, Birth-Defective Infants: A Standard for Nontreatment Decisions,
30 STAN. L. REV. 599 (1978); Comment, Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborns: Substituted Judg-
ment, Informed Consent, and the Quinlan Decision, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 781 (1978).
71. See generally Cooke, Whose Suffering?, 80 J. PEDIATRICS 906 (1972); Duff & Campbell, Moral and
Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973); Fletcher, Abortion,
Euthanasia, and Care of Defective Newborns, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 75 (1975); Gustafson, Mongolism,
Parental Desires, and the Right to Life, 16 PERSPECTIVES BIOLOGY & MED. 529 (1973); McCormick, To Save
or Let Die: The Dilemma of Modern Medicine, 229 J.A.M.A. 172 (1974).
72. The spinal disorder was characterized as spina bifida with myelomeningocele, which is an opening in
the spine covered by a very thin membrane. This condition makes infection highly probable. In re Cicero, 101
Misc. 2d 699, 700, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966 (1979). For an interesting discussion of this disorder see Hauerwas,
Selecting Children to Live or Die: An Ethical Analysis of the Debate Between Dr. Lorber and Dr. Freeman on
the Treatment of Meningomyelocele in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA 228 (D. Horam & D. Molt eds.
1977).
73. In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 965 (1979).
74. Chabon, You May Face a Nightmare in the Newborn Nursery, LEGAL ASPECTS MED. PRAC., June,
1979 at 43-45.
75. Duff & Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED.
890 (1973).
76. See Gustafson, Mongolism, Parental Desires, and the Right to Life, 16 PERSPECTIVES BIOLOGY &
MED. 529 (1973).
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ing treatment from defective newborns. At Johns Hopkins University
Hospital, a premature boy was born with Down's Syndrome and an intestinal
blockage. Surgery was needed to correct the blockage in order for the child to
take nourishment. The parents of the infant, a nurse and a lawyer, refused to
consent to the life-saving surgery, and neither the hospital staff nor the
physicians sought a court order to perform the operation. The child died of
starvation eleven days later.
When situations such as these reach the courts, court resolution in favor
of treatment may seem to be an unbearable imposition on the parents, who
already may be overwhelmed by the birth of an unhealthy child. The problem
is aggravated by the obviously disparate legal treatment such parents receive,
as compared with the treatment accorded to those parents whose family
doctors favor their decision to withhold medical care. Absent specific and
well defined laws, most parents could avoid the court encounter and litigation
of the matter by choosing well ahead of their child's birth a physician who
agrees with them about these delicate life and death matters. Commentators
have espoused total nonintervention by the state in the parental decision to
withhold treatment from a severely defective newborn, 77 and medical com-
pliance with court ordered deference to the parental decision to withhold
treatment. 78 Court intervention severely limits parental autonomy and runs
the risk of imposing the court's morality and judgment on the affected parents
and children.
In In re Cicero the court declared that it was neither infringing on valid
parental rights nor overstepping the bounds beyond which a court is em-
powered to intervene. The New York Supreme Court stated, "Where, as
here, a child has a reasonable chance to live a useful, fulfilled life, the court
will not permit parental inaction to deny that chance." 79 When other courts
have been confronted with similar situations, they also have opted to save
defective lives.80
Since the practice of withholding medical treatment from defective new-
borns is prevalent and not likely to be eradicated by anything less than a
full-blown societal movement culminating in the enactment of stringent laws,
it is interesting to note briefly some suggestions being made by persons in
different occupations regarding the proper resolution of this problem. Before
the Best Interests of the Child8' represents the combined effort of a physician,
a psychoanalyst, and a lawyer to delineate guidelines for the propriety of state
intrusion in family matters. Generally, the authors advocate minimal state
intrusion, arguing that state intervention should be permitted only if three
77. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).
78. Position Paper, 24 CAN. J. PSYCH. 75 (1979).
79. 101 Misc. 2d 699, 702, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965, 968 (1979).
80. For example, in Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Civil No. 74-145 (Me. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 1974), the
court ordered surgery to correct a condition afflicting the feeding and respiration of a child who was born with
multiple physical defects, and who had suffered brain damage.
81. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).
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factors are present: (1) the medical profession must agree that the nonexperi-
mental treatment should be given to the child; (2) the child will die without
treatment; and (3) if the treatment is successful, the child will then have a
"life worth living" 2-as judged by societal standards. The authors believe
that since societal consensus exists in only a few narrowly defined situa-
tions, in most cases there will be no consensus in the determination of
whether a child's life is a "life worth living." As a result, the state would
intervene in only a few cases. They assert that the state should not intervene
in the parental decision to reject life-saving treatment for a severely defective
newborn unless the state can provide an adequate parental substitute for the
child and the financing required to meet the special needs of the child. Had
these principles been applied in In re Cicero, the case would never have
reached the court since there is no medical consensus that treatment should
be administered in that situation, nor societal consensus that the infant would
have a "life worth living."
At the other end of the spectrum is the position taken by the Canadian
Psychiatric Association.83 Its recommendations are as follows: (1) treatment
should never be withheld from defective newborns, such as those afflicted
with Down's Syndrome or spina bifida, if the treatment would not be withheld
from "normal" infants; (2) the act of withholding treatment should be con-
sidered a legal and not a medical matter, requiring a court order to implement
it; and (3) the medical profession should take steps to inform the parents fully
concerning the factors to be considered in a decision to withhold treatment.
The Association bases its recommendations on the belief that there is a very
real possibility of finding a cure for genetic defects, such as those causing
Down's Syndrome. It also asserts that it is within the medical expertise to
save lives, and that this expertise does not carry over to terminating lives or to
placing a value on those lives. The Association points out that Down's
Syndrome children are "warm-hearted, effervescent, usually happy and [a]
warmly responsive group of people." 84 As another commentator has sug-
gested, "Just as the sacrifice of newborn infants with Down's Syndrome is the
logical extension of the abortion of viable infants with Down's Syndrome, the
rationalization of withholding care for newborns establishes a precedent for
neglecting older children with Down's Syndrome." 85 This happened in the
case considered below.
82. Id. But see Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 754, 370 N.E.2d
417, 432 (1977), in which the court rejected the "quality of life" argument as a determinative factor in the
decision to withhold medical treatment from an incompetent adult with an IQ of ten and a mental age below
three years of age.
83. Position Paper, 24 CAN. J. PSYCH. 75 (1979).
84. Id. at 76.
85. See E. Diamond, The Deformed Child's Right to Live in DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA 127, 131
(1977).
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2. In re Phillip B.
In re Phillip B. 86 concerned a twelve-year-old Down's Syndrome child
who needed surgery to correct a congenital heart defect. If left untreated, this
defect would cause progressive and irreversible damage to the boy's lungs,
and he would be increasingly devitalized to the point of leading a bed-to-chair
existence. At best, it was estimated that he would survive twenty more years,
but his life would be severely restricted. When Phillip's parents refused to
consent to the surgery, the juvenile probation department filed a petition with
the juvenile court requesting that Phillip be declared a dependent child of the
court for the sole purpose of assuring that he receive the corrective surgery.
The court, applying a "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof,
dismissed the petition, and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal. The United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The crucial question presented by In re Phillip B. is: What are the permis-
sible legal limits of parental autonomy in determining whether to withhold
medical treatment from a minor in light of the state's power to intervene to
protect such individual's best interests? By its disposition of the case, the
court apparently believed that the outer limits of parental autonomy were not
exceeded and that the parents had acted properly. However, due to the unique
set of facts confronting the court, the decision is rather startling, if not dis-
quieting, for though Phillip did not face imminent death, without the operation
a torturous or sudden death would be a daily possibility.
The major difference between the situation faced by the parents of a
defective newborn and that faced by the parents of an older child with a defect
is that in the latter case it is possible to determine more accurately the extent
of the disability and the medical prognosis. In other respects, the situations
are comparable. As is true with a defective newborn, successful treatment of
a mongoloid child's heart defect would alleviate one medical problem but
leave the underlying handicap untouched. Since Phillip was classified as a
"'high functioning trainable mentally retarded' 87 boy, his underlying handi-
cap was not severe, and the parental decision to withhold medical treatment
from him was more questionable. One reason given by Phillip's parents for
refusing to consent to the surgical procedure was that Phillip's life, due to his
mental retardation, was not a "life worth living."8 However, time and time
again courts have stressed the fact that mental and physical handicaps have
no relation to the value placed on life.8 9 The "poor" quality of Phillip's life
86. 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
87. Baines, In re Phillip B.: Unequal Protection for the Retarded? 4 AMICUS 128 (1979). According to
Baines, there was a possibility that Phillip would be able to work in a competitive environment. Id. at 128.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., In re Spring, - Mass. App. Ct. __, 399 N.E.2d 493 (1979): "T]he Saikewicz case
recognizes a presumption in favor of the life-saving, life-prolonging treatment decision-a factual presump-
tion, based on common experience, that most persons would elect life over death, regardless of age or level of
intelligence." Id. at -, 399 N.E.2d at 497 n.5. In Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,227 A.2d 689 (1967), the
New Jersey Supreme Court said:
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may have entered into the appellate court's determination that there was
substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision to deny the request
for an order of treatment. If so, this case may stand for the unprecedented
proposition that the limits of parental autonomy are not surpassed when
parents decide to withhold life-preserving medical treatment from their child
merely because of his moderate mental handicap.
The appellate court in In re Phillip B. affirmed the trial court's decision
seemingly on the basis of the risks posed by the surgery, and not on the basis
of Phillip's mental retardation. It is difficult to believe that the parents were
concerned about the risks of surgery after Phillip's father conceded that, in his
opinion, "it would be better for everyone, including Phillip, if Phillip were
dead now." 9' The risk consisted of a maximum ten percent chance of death
from the surgical procedure. On the other hand, if the surgery successfully
corrected the defect, the benefits would be substantial: Phillip would probably
live a normal life span instead of less than twenty years, the progressive
damage to his lungs would be arrested, and he would be subject to signifi-
cantly fewer risks of an early and sudden death. Consequently, it is hard to
justify the court's decision on the basis of the risk factor alone, especially in
light of the other factors that were considered in making the decision. 92 In any
case, there is precedent for the proposition that state intervention will be
denied when parents reasonably conclude that the risks of treatment outweigh
the benefits.93
The controversial decision of the court can be explained on procedural
grounds. The trial court determined that the evidence presented by the state
in support of the petition was inconclusive. Because of the nature of the issue
involved, the state was required to prove its case by clear and convincing
evidence, something it failed to do. This factor alone may have tipped the
[Mle would almost surely choose life with defects as against no life at all.... Examples of famous
persons who have had great achievement despite physical defects come readily to mind, and many of
us can think of examples close to home. A child need not be perfect to have a worthwhile life.
Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693. In In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1979), a New York Supreme
Court stated:
This is not a case where the court is asked to preserve an existence which cannot be a lifei What is
asked is that a child born with handicaps be given a reasonable opportunity to live, to grow, and
hopefully to surmount those handicaps. If the power to make that choice is vested in the court, there
can be no doubt as to what the choice must be.
Id. at 701, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 967. In In re Weberlist, 79 Misc. 2d 753, 360 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1979), the New York
Supreme Court for New York County said: "There is a strident cry in America to terminate the lives of other
people-deemed physically or mentally defective.... [O]ne test of a civilization is its concern with the survival
of the 'unfittest,' a reversal of Darwin's formulation." Id. at 757, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
90. See, e.g., Maine Medical Center v. Houle, Civil No. 74-145 (Me. Super. Ct. Feb. 14, 1974); In re
Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1979).
91. See Baines, In re Phillip B.: Unequal Protection for the Retarded?, 4 AMICUS 128, 129 (1979).
92. The other factors that were to be taken into account are the following: "'Mhe seriousness of the harm
the child is suffering or the substantial likelihood that he will suffer serious harm; the evaluation for the
treatment by the medical profession; ... and the expressed preferences of the child." In re Philip B., 92 Cal.
App. 3d 796, 802, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 949 (1980).
93. In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 561 (1912); In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
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balance in favor of the long-standing presumption that parents act in their
child's best interests.'
One commentator has argued that life-saving and life-prolonging treat-
ment should be withheld by parents, without court or state intervention, only
in situations of medical infeasibility. 95 A treatment is "infeasible" if the child
faces imminent death or irreversible unconsciousness, regardless of treatment
or nontreatment. Parental autonomy is unquestionably protected in situations
of medical infeasibility. Since Phillip did not face imminent death or irrever-
sible unconsciousness, his situation was not one of medical infeasibility.
Thus, this model provides no support for the court's approval of Phillip's
parents' refusal to consent to the corrective surgery.
3. In Re Hofbauer
Much controversy surrounds the use of unconventional treatment, such
as the administration of laetrile, for cancer patients.9 In re Hofbauer97 in-
volved a parental decision to administer such treatment to a minor. Even
though the choice to administer unconventional therapy may be equated with
the decision to withhold treatment from a child, the state's decision to inter-
vene is a greater infringement on family privacy in the former case where
parents merely choose one treatment over another. However, courts have
viewed the problem as one involving a parental refusal to administer a well-
known method of treatment that poses great danger to the child.
In Custody of a Minor,98 a case decided on similar facts prior to
Hofbauer, the court reached a different result. Custody of a Minor involved a
three-year-old child afflicted with acute lymphocytic leukemia. 99 The ortho-
dox treatment of such a disease is chemotherapy, but some physicians believe
that "metabolic therapy"'00 is useful in the treatment of childhood leukemia
or other types of cancer, mainly because of its detoxification and placebo
effects.' 0 ' After the child was treated with chemotherapy, which had brought
94. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979). -[H]istorically it has been recognized that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children." Id. at 602.
95. Note, Birth-Defective Infants: A Standard for Nontreatment Decisions, 30 STAN. L. REV. 599, 624
(1978).
96. See generally Note, In re Hofbauer: May Parents Choose Unorthodox Medical Care for their Child?,
44 ALB. L. REV. 818 (1980); Note, Of Love and Laetrile: Medical Decisionmaking in a Child's Best Interests, 5
AM. J. L. MED. 271 (1979); Note, Judicial Limitations on Parental Autonomy in Medical Treatment of Minors,
59 NEB. L. REV. 1093 (1980).
97. 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979).
98. 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978), rev'd and aff'd, - Mass. -, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979).
99. Leukemia: Progressive proliferation of abnormal leukocytes found in hemopoietic tissues, other
organs, and usually in the blood in increased numbers. L. is classified by the dominant cell type, and by
duration from onset to death. This occurs in acute L within a few months in most cases, and is
associated with symptoms that suggest acute infection, with severe anemia, hemorrhages, and slight
enlargement of lymph nodes or the spleen.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICrIONARY ILLUSTRATED 775 (23d ed. 1976).
100. According to the court, "metabolic therapy" consists of "daily administration of enzymes, large
doses of vitamins, and the drug amygdalin, more popularly known as lactrile." Custody ofaMinor,-.Mass.
App. Ct. .. , , 393 N.E.2d 836, 839 (1979).
101. Id. at -, 393 N.E.2d at 841. The detoxification effect "improves a patient's tolerance for chemo-
therapy and increases his or her appetite, energy level and general sense of wellbeing." Id. The placebo effect is
"a psychogenic response deriving essentially from human susceptibility to the power of positive suggestion."
Id.
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the disease into a state of remission, the parents discontinued the treatment
and refused to recommence it. The treating physician sought a court order to
reinstate the chemotherapy since the child's leukemia had reappeared. The
parents argued that they should be the ones to decide, without state interven-
tion, which course of treatment the child should undergo. The court rejected
the argument and ordered the treatment after finding that the child had a
substantial chance of cure with chemotherapy, that the usual noxious side
effects of chemotherapy were absent or easily controllable, and that the child
would die without chemotherapy. The decisive factor was that the medical
testimony was uncontradicted in favor of chemotherapy.
At a review and redetermination hearing, the court affirmed its prior
order. 02 There, the parents were not contesting the administration of chemo-
therapy, but merely requesting that metabolic therapy be administered as a
supplement to chemotherapy. The court found that metabolic therapy posed a
serious threat to the child's health by way of cyanide poisoning, hypervita-
minosis A, and bacterial infection, and that it was dangerous and inadvisable.
Hofbauer was decided after the trial court's decision in Custody of a
Minor, but before that court's decision on appeal. The eight-year-old child in
Hofbauer was suffering from Hodgkin's disease,' 3 a disease usually treated
with radiation and chemotherapy. Instead, the parents decided to treat the
child with metabolic therapy, and sought the services of a licensed physician
who favored that treatment. A neglect proceeding was instituted, but the
court ruled in favor of the parents. The court rested its decision on the follow-
ing facts: (1) numerous licensed physicians had treated the child; (2) the
parents justifiably feared the side effects of radiation and chemotherapy; (3) the
metabolic therapy was controlling the disease; (4) the parents were willing to
administer conventional therapy, if necessary; and (5) the parents were loving
and sincerely concerned about the child's welfare. The court distinguished
Custody of a Minor: "Nor is this a case where the parents have made a [sic]
irreversible decision to deprive their child of a certain mode of treatment." 104
There are other ways of factually distinguishing the cases. In Custody of
a Minor the metabolic therapy was poisoning the child, while in Hofbauer
there was no evidence of toxicity. In Hofbauer the metabolic therapy was
arresting the disease, while in Custody of a Minor the evidence indicated that,
not only did it lack a curative effect, but also the disease had reappeared
without the chemotherapy. Finally, in Custody of a Minor, the medical evi-
dence was uncontradicted in favor of chemotherapy, while in Hojbauer the
medical evidence was sharply conflicting.
102. - Mass. -, 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979).
103. Hodgkin's disease, or lymphadoma, is a condition in which the lymphatic glands all over the body
undergo a gradual progressive enlargement. The cause is not known. The glands affected may reach a
great size. The patient often runs a characteristic form of fever... in which bouts of fever alternate
with several days with no fever. Along with these changes a considerable degree of anemia arises, and
the affected person becomes gradually weaker. Treatment consists of radio therapy when the disease is
relatively localized. When it is more widespread, however, chemotherapy is the treatment of choice.
BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (29th ed., reprinted 1972).
104. 47 N.Y.2d 648, 656, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936, 941 (1979).
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Although the children in both cases were suffering from a type of cancer,
one commentator has noted that it is "absurd to describe a group as a 'class of
cancer patients' or measures to treat them as 'conventional approaches to
cancer therapy.' Childhood leukemia and cancer of the pancreas are as differ-
ent as the common cold is from a stomach ache." 0 5 Therefore, it is not unlikely
that leukemia and Hodgkin's disease responded differently to the metabolic
therapy simply because they are completely different diseases, requiring dif-
ferent treatments. "If a physician treated them the same way, he would be
guilty of malpractice and ignorant of the advances of the past few decades. To
group them together deprives the legal system of the enlightenment medicine
can provide."'06 This medical fact draws the two cases further apart and
highlights the need to resolve cases in this area, not only on the basis of
precedent, but also on the basis of informed medical opinions.
The rule that emerges from these two cases is that the parental decision
to choose a method of treatment not widely embraced by the medical com-
munity will be honored if there is some medical evidence to support the
decision. More deference is accorded the parental decision to choose among
several alternative treatments'07 than to choose to withhold treatment alto-
gether. Unless there is empirical proof that the method of treatment chosen by
the parents is harming the child-like cyanide poisoning in Custody of a
Minor-the court will not impose its own subjective judgment.
V. A FINAL WORD
An overview of the present state of the law in the area indicates that there
is no easy solution to the problem of setting workable and effective guidelines
to determine when or whether to withhold medical treatment from a child.
The particular facts of each case are linked inextricably to the final resolution
of the case. The evaluation by the medical profession plays a vital role in
defining the desirability of treatment, the risks posed by the particular treat-
ment, and the medical prognosis after treatment. The parental decision to
withhold medical treatment from a child should not be upheld in the absence
of a solid medical basis backing up the parental choice. However, since
medicine is not an exact science, the medical evaluation is merely an informed
opinion on probabilities at a certain point in time. For example, diseases that
could not be treated in the past can be treated successfully today. Therefore,
the medical evaluation should not have conclusive effect on the final decision
by the court.
105. Marco, Why Chad Green Died in Mexico, LEGAL ASPECTS MED. PRAC. Dec., 1979, at 19, 21.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., In re C.F.B., 497 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973), in which the parental choice of psychi-
atric care was upheld over the state's petition that the child be declared a ward of the court for the purpose of
ensuring that the child receive "proper" care for her ailment. The court stated, "The mother had a right to
choose between different doctors or institutions for the purpose of this type of care. So long as the mother was
willing and intended to provide appropriate care in some manner, no finding can stand that she was guilty of
neglecting the child." Id. at 835.
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Though courts are generally strongly influenced by the parents' wishes
under the doctrine of parental autonomy, the deference due the parental deci-
sion must be tempered by the "best interests of the child." In the case of the
defective newborn, for example, the parents may have a conflict of interest and
may not be the best decision makers. They may be concerned with the welfare
of the child and also with their own interests, such as their interest in avoid-
ing the financial and emotional strain involved in caring for a child with special
needs. An analysis based solely on such cost-benefit considerations is not
ultimately in the best interests of the child. Therefore, the court should accord
less deference to the parental decision to withhold treatment in a situation in
which a conflict of interest exists. The court decision always should be in
favor of the best interests of the child.
The decision to withhold medical treatment from a child is not primarily a
matter of legal concern. Ethical considerations stand in the foreground. The
decision to withhold treatment from a child--especially from a defective new-
born-has serious moral implications. For example, if one accepts the validity
of withholding treatment from a defective newborn who has serious medical
complications, is it less ethical to withhold nourishment from an equally
defective child, who does not require medical attention at birth? Is it less
ethical to withhold treatment from a defective newborn who develops a com-
mon and treatable childhood disease? A line must be drawn. A well-defined
standard must be developed in the context of withholding treatment from
children, a standard that, at the very least, would have allowed Phillip B. to
live a long life.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cases involving the parental decision to withhold medical treatment from
a child will continue to be decided on a case-by-case basis until the Supreme
Court squarely addresses the issue and carefully defines the outer limits of
parental autonomy. Even though it is axiomatic to say that "parents do not
and must not have absolute authority over the life and death of their child-
ren,' ' 08 in actual practice, such authority is being exercised in many cases.
Generally, parents and physicians agree on the course of conduct that will be
followed in a particular case, without state intervention. Also, in the infre-
quent cases where the matter reaches the court-as when the physician dis-
agrees with the parents' choice of treatment-the court, in turn, exercises its
own subjective judgment. Meanwhile, many children will suffer the conse-
quences of this lack of definitive guidance. It will continue to be true that "a
significant deviation from normal intelligence, coupled with the appropriate
parental desire, is sufficient to permit an infant to die. ' 9
Yolanda V. Vorys
108. Custody of a Minor, - Mass... .. 393 N.E.2d 836, 846 (1979).
109. Gustafson, Mongolism, Parental Desires, and the Right to Life, 16 PERSPECTIVES BIOLOGY MED.
529, 545 (1973).
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